This paper discuses the effect of the minimum wage level on the decision to join the informal job sector. We estimate a pseudo panel of the engagement in the informal sector using an IV-probit. The findings show that an increase in the minimum wage level leads to a substitution effect between young and older workers. This results show that the standards effects over the labor market in the WGM segmented model are moderate because an increase of the minimum wage level does not imply total mobility between sectors.
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Introduction
The minimum wage in Colombia is established through negotiations between representatives of the workers' union and an employers' association in December every year. If they fail to reach an agreement, the government establishes the minimum wage. Only in three out of the last eight years there has been an agreement between both parties.
The minimum wage is a key element of economic and social policy in developing countries. The minimum wage affects not only workers in the formal sector, but also many prices and taxes which are set based on it in Colombia. For this reason, the policy with respect to the minimum wage is significant in Colombia where approximately 56 percent of all workers earn the minimum wage (Hernandez and Pinzon 2006, 12) and 73 percent of all workers affiliated to the social security system earn two or less minimum salaries (Arango, Herrera and Posada 2007, 14) .
Furthermore, the minimum wage is the base level for wages in the formal sector. Although there are different explanations as to what is considered informal and formal, there seems to be a consensus with regard to the ease of joining the informal sector because there are no entry barriers. In the formal sector, on the contrary, labor laws, company regulations, and fixed minimum wages, among others, have become entry barriers. In this context, government intervention in the economy via the determination of the minimum wage generates incentives to either join or leave the informal sector; for example, the minimum wage generates incentives to choose one sector. In this article we assume that those who work in the informal sector have actually chosen to do so.
Compared to other approaches to the problem, this paper differs in several aspects. Another contribution of this paper is the discussion of the higher minimum wages over labor force participation. In the standard WGM two-sector model, Welch (1976) , Gramlich (1976 ), Mincer (1976 , a higher minimum wage implies low wages in the uncovered or informal sector because of the movements from the formal to the informal sector, and the employment effects are negative in the informal sector and positive in the formal sector, Lemos (2009) . Yet it is possible that the effects of the higher minimum wages on employment in the informal sector are moderate due to the substitution effects between young and older workers in the labor participation in the informal sector. This characteristic is particularly important in developing countries where the informality rate is high, and the total effect of the higher minimum wage over informality depends on the proportion of young/older workers over the total labor force participation in the informal sector This paper is organized as follows: the second section discusses the literature about the effects of the minimum wage on employment and on both the formal and informal sectors. The third section presents a model and describes the methodology for modeling the engagement in the informal sector based on pseudo panel data. The fourth section presents estimates of the model using an instrumental variable probit and presents the correction of the selection bias. We conclude in the last section.
Literature Review
The theory suggests that the impact of minimum wages on the labor market depends either on competitive or non-competitive assumptions. In a competitive labor market, minimum wages established above the market equilibrium wage result in unemployment. In a monopolistic labor market, if the minimum wage is above the monopsony wage level (but below the competitive level), employment will increase.
Literature shows ambiguous effects of the minimum wage on the unemployment rate. Card and Krueger (1994) found that the restaurants in New Jersey, where the minimum wage was raised, expanded the workforce in comparison to restaurants in Pennsylvania. However, using different data, Newmark and Washer (1995) found an increase in unemployment in New Jersey. CastilloFreeman and Freeman (1992) found that in Puerto Rico a 10% increase in the minimum wage caused an employment reduction of 5%. With respect to the results of Castillo-Freeman and Freman (1992) , Krueger (1995) showed that the results are statistically fragile. Bell (1997) found that in Mexico the minimum wage has had no effects on wages in the formal employment sector, but found substantial unemployment effects associated with the minimum wage in Colombia. Suryahadi et al. (2003) discuss the substitution effects: minimum wage decreases employment of unskilled workers and increase employment of white-collar workers.
In developing countries, Lemos (2007) showed that higher minimum wages in Brazil are associated with a reduction of inequality but not with lower employment. Lemos (2009) also showed that the employment effects are due to assumptions of the segmented or integrated labor market.
In Colombia, Magnac (1991) provides the first contrast of informality in Colombia. In Magnac's (1991) bivariate probit model, the informal sector is identified with self-employment (excluding employers). The obtained results reject a segmented labor market hypothesis. However, Magnac's model shows that when an individual chooses to work in the formal sector, the benefits associated with not working are indistinguishable from the benefits of working in the informal sector.
Núñez (2002) Finally, Hernández and Pinzon (2006) discussed the effect of increase of minimum wage on labor participation using pooled data and found that there are substitution effects on workers with an increase in the minimum wage. However, Hernández and Pinzon (2006) 
Model Specification
The labor force participation shows individuals that maximize their utility over consumption and leisure, subject to budget constraints and dependent upon the time available for these activities, Gronau (1973) , Deaton and Muellbauer (1980 ), Pencavel (1986 ), Killingsworth (1986 and Brue and Macpherson (2003) .
In developing countries, the standard WGM two-sector model, Welch (1976) , Gramlich (1976) , Mincer (1976) , shows that when a group of workers is outside the umbrella of minimum wage legislation, a minimum wage increases implies that wages in the uncovered sector fall as a result of displaced workers in the covered sector moving into uncovered sector employment. Then the wage effect is expected to be positive in the covered sector and negative in the uncovered sector,
It is evident that the prediction of the WGM model implies segmentation in the labor market. In
Colombia, Arango and Posada (2001) suggest the possibility of segmentation based on a discussion of the unemployment rate. García et al. (2007) Jaramillo et al. (2000) and Gálvis (2002) using time series find that there is no cointegration among wages, i.e. there is a segmented labor market.
With respect to the results of the WGM model, we suppose that if there are segmented labor markets in a developing country (such as, for example, Colombia), the results of increased minimum wage is moderate due to substitution effects between young and older workers. On other hand, the total effects on a particular labor market are due to the proportion of young/older workers in the economy. Thus, we suppose that the mobility within sectors with a minimum wage is not perfect because of the benefits of the minimum wage. Let us assume that the government imposes a minimum wage for the formal sector in the economy. Then, an individual's decision to join the informal sector results from comparing the benefits of working in the formal sector versus the benefits of working in the informal sector. Now, work in the formal sector consists of a standard fixed work time, and the guarantee of social security, pension, and health. The opportunity cost of leisure is different for young people and older people because the benefits of working in the formal or informal sector are different. It must be noted that the individual decision of participating in a specific sector implies considering the formal-informal sector wage ratio and produces substitution effects on the labor force.
Let us assume that individuals are able to choose whether they want to join the formal or informal sector based on a set of variables, Fields (1990) , Maloney (2004) 3 . Therefore, the engagement in the informal sector can be estimated as follows:
Ii(t),t * = β0´Si(t),t +β1´NLi(t),t +β2´ Hmalei(t),t + β3´ OUH(t),t + β4´ CMWi(t),t + ηi(t) + µi(t),t > 0 (1)
Where Ii(t),t * is a latent variable that represents earnings from working in a given sector and Ii(t),t equals one when an individual chooses to work in the informal sector or otherwise zero. The "i(t)" subscripts indicate that the observations are independent cross-sectional series where N individuals are only available in each period. Since there are different individuals in each period, i ranges from 1 to N for each t. Deaton (1985) suggests using cohorts to obtain consistent estimators of β when numeric variables are used and adjusting the estimator with the measurement errors. Moffitt (1993) proposed an IV-probit approach which, in the case of independent continuous variables subject to measurement errors, implies using a set of timeinvariant variables and a set of time-variant variables,
CMWi(t),t = λ1´Ci(t) + Z i(t),t + ω i(t),t
Si(t),t represents the number of years of education, which decrease the likelihood of joining the informal sector, Magnac (1991) , Núñez (2002), Ribero (2003) and Uribe et al. (2006) . NLi(t),t represents non-labor income, which decreases the likelihood of participating, Núñez (2002), Ribero (2003) . Hmalei(t),t represents a male head of a household, which increases the likelihood of participation in the informal sector, Uribe et al. (2006) . CMWi(t),t represents the interaction between cohort variables and the minimum wage. In young individuals -cohorts 1 to 3 -the opportunity cost of working in the informal sector is low, and we expect the sign to be positive when there is an increase in the minimum wage. However, to older individuals -cohorts 4 to 6 -the opportunity cost of working in the informal sector is high, and a negative sign is expected. OUHi(t),t is a dummy variable that takes a value of either one if there is more than one individual unemployed in a household, or otherwise zero. We expected this variable to have a positive sign, . The ηi(t) variable represents the deviation of the effect of the cohort after breaking down fixed individual effects. Therefore, if there are any fixed individual effects, these will be consistent with fixed effects in the cohort. Finally, Ci(t) in (4) to (6) are time-invariant cohorts, whereas Zi(t),t represent time-variant variables. With regard to the latter there is no agreement as to which variables should be incorporated in Zi(t),t.
However, since economic growth is a determining factor when setting the minimum salary, the GDP lagged by a period is used as Z i(t),t. It is also worth noting that binary variables will not be subject to correction, Deaton (1985) .
Data
The labor market in Colombia showed an increasing rate of female labor force [Insert Table 1] As shown in Table 1 above, the average number of years of education is close to 10. This number seems to have been stable for the past 10 years. Mora and Muro (2008) showed a similar average for the period 1995-2000 also using pseudo panel data. Labor income and nonlabor income were adjusted for inflation in each of the metropolitan areas, showing a slight improvement probably due to economic growth and the inflation drop. It must also be noted that the real minimum wage has been increasing in all metropolitan areas. Other unemployment in the households (OUH) has remained stable at nearly 30% throughout the entire period under review.
The percentage of male heads of households who participate in the informal sector is close to 10%. 4 Finally, there are no substantial differences among the number of individuals each year.
With respect to the wages, we calculated by cohorts and cities the ratio between wages and minimum real wages by main cities and found an inverted U.
[Insert Figure 1 ] In figure 2 , the ratio is increasing in young cohorts and decreasing in old cohorts. Next, we explored participation in the informal labor market and found that the informal sector is not homogeneous by cohorts and regions. The results are depicted in Figure 2 .
[Insert Figure 2 ] Figure 2 shows that the youngest cohort has the highest participation in the informal sector.
Medellín is the city with the lowest participation in the informal sector rates in each cohort, while Cartagena, on the other hand, has the lowest participation in the informal sector in the fourth cohort throughout the entire period under review.
Results
The estimates by Núñez (2002), Ribero (2003) and Uribe et al. (2006) of participation in the informal employment sector were determined only for working individuals. Ribero (2003) justifies this selection because there are other models, such as those by Ribero and Meza (1997) , which specifically represent labor participation in Colombia. Uribe et al. (2006) did not raise any special considerations with regard to this. The results of the model of engagement in the informal sector are discussed below.
[Insert Table 2] The first column in Table 2 shows a pooled probit, which is determined based on model (3) for the entire sample without considering the existence of a measurement error because of the nature of the pseudo panel. The sign of the years of education is negative and statistically significant. The effect of the minimum wage on each cohort is positive and statistically significant on the probability of joining the informal sector. Only the last cohort shows negative effects on the decision to join the informal sector. The signs of non-labor income are not as expected and
Hmale was found to be not significant.
The last column in Table 2 , instrumental variable probit, shows the estimated probability of joining the informal sector using the pseudo panel technique 5 . Table 2 also discusses the existence of selection biases. As indicated by Ribero (2003) and Uribe et al. (2006) , estimates of a model of engagement in the informal sector for the entire sample of workers led to the occurrence of selection biases because the unemployment choice was not considered 6 .
The existence of such selection biases was corrected by estimating and incorporating Mills inverse ratio in model (3). We estimated the likelihood of participating based on the number of working individuals in the cohort following the work of Gronau (1974) and Lewis (1974) and Mora and Muro (2007) . Mora and Muro (2007) showed that it was possible to correct the existence of selection biases based on a semi-parametric contrast, which involves incorporating Mills inverse ratio. This Mills inverse ratio is calculated from the proportion of the labor participating individuals in each cohort with respect to the total number of individuals in the cohorts 7 .
The results show that all coefficients are statistically significant, and the percentage of success of the model is above 66 percent. The years of education and non-labor income have negative effects on the probability of joining the informal sector. Hmale and OUN variables have a positive sign. In order to consider the relationship between minimum wage and informality, dummy interactions between the cohorts and the minimum wage were incorporated. We assumed two different types of interaction: The first one considers the minimum level, and the second one considers the ratio of the wages over minimum wages. Both interactions show that an increase in the minimum wage produces an increase of the probability to join the informal sector in young cohorts and decreases the probability to join the informal sector in older cohorts. These results show an interesting issue: an increase in the minimum wage produces substitution effects among young and older individuals in the informal labor market. 8
Finally, the Mills inverse ratio was negative and statistically significant, thus corroborating selection bias in the sample.
Conclusions
The engagement of informal workers in the labor market is a topic that has been recently discussed in Colombia. Concerning the determining factors of engagement in the informal sector, there is only consensus around the assumption that the higher the educational level, the higher the incentives to engage in the informal sector, and non-labor income has negative effects.
On the other hand, the standard results of the WGM model in a developing country could be moderate if there are substitution effects between young and older workers. The estimates discussed in this paper corroborate this negative effect of both education and non-labor income on the decision to join the informal sector.
Besides having an impact on the distribution of wages among formal and informal workers, Arango and Pachón (2004) , Maloney and Núñez (2003) , Lemos (2007 Lemos ( , 2009 9 , the minimum wage also generates incentives to join one sector or another. Therefore, the estimates provided in this paper show that there are substitution effects on the labor market.
Therefore, we recommend that the political discussion about the elimination of the minimum wage in Colombia should incorporate an analysis of the current encouraging factors that have had an impact on the Colombian labor market. It is also necessary to conduct a more in-depth discussion of advisable policies with respect to the reduction or elimination of the minimum wage in Colombia.
9 Arango and Pachón (2004) , and Maloney and Núñez (2003) did not estimate the effect of minimum wages on the informal employment share directly. B a r r a n q u i l l a B o g o t a C a r t a g e n a M a n i z a l e s S a n t a M a r t a V i l l a v i c e n c i o P e r e i r a C u c u t a P a s t o B u c a r a m a n g a I b a g u e C a l i Source: Authors' calculations from The National Housing Survey (DANE-ECH).
